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ABSTRACT 
We study how local labor market conditions and information about jobs affect recidivism among 
former inmates. Our identification strategy exploits daily variations on new job vacancies and 
news coverage of job openings and closings at the county level, merged with individual-level 
administrative data on inmates released from French prisons. Overall job creations do not affect 
recidivism, but inmates released when more jobs in manufacturing are created are less likely to 
recidivate. We also show that media coverage of job creation reduces recidivism, beyond actual 
employment opportunities, suggesting implications for crime-control policies: information about 
employment contributes to reduce recidivism.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Theoretically, labor markets are considered to be an important determinant of crime. 
The standard economic model of criminal behavior (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973) 
implies that potential offenders should decrease criminal activities when they face an 
increase in job availability. All else equal, the opportunity cost of time spent both in 
criminal activity and in prison if apprehended and convicted rises when labor market 
conditions improve.2 However, for this prediction to hold, potential offenders would 
have to respond to variations in incentives created by changing labor market 
conditions. Although intuitive, this may not be a relevant margin for people who are 
most likely to offend, and in particular for people who are just released from prison. 
People entering prison tend to not have been employed in the formal sector (Western 
and Pettit, 2005; Loeffler, 2013), and post-release, they might be screened out by 
employers in legal labor markets (Agan and Starr, 2016), or they may be opting for 
informal jobs (Western et al, 2015). They may also lack relevant human capital or 
information about job availability, or incarceration could have increased the returns to 
crime beyond that of any legally accessible job. Understanding how former inmates’ 
recidivism responds to factors that might affect their probability of finding a job is 
crucial when designing effective crime control policies. In this paper, we ask how job 
availability and information about employment affects reoffending. 
 
We focus on the relevant but overlooked role that local labor markets play in re-
offending. This exercise poses empirical challenges, due to confounding factors 
correlated with both labor markets and offending. For example, people with better 
jobs might elect to move out of higher crime areas, leading to a non-causal correlation 
between crime and lower job availability. We address these major identification 
challenges by using granular data on releases from prison and on job availability, and 
exploiting daily variations in labor markets upon release from prison.  
 
For our study, we combine three administrative data sources. The first source is 
administrative data on all inmates released from France in 2009-2010, provided by the 
                                                      
2 Job-search models of labor markets and crime also predict, from another angle, that more job 
opportunities for individuals just released from prison would reduce recidivism (Engelhardt, 2010). 
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French Ministry of Justice. The second source is high-frequency administrative data 
on new job vacancies in French firms provided by the French agency for employment 
(Pôle emploi – PE henceforth). Finally, we use data on media coverage of 
employment collected on a daily basis at the county level. These data, collected by a 
private firm, include newspaper and Internet coverage of job openings and closings. 
For each former inmate, we construct two indexes relative to their county of residence 
in the thirty days following their release from prison: the number of PE job vacancies; 
and the number of news stories on job openings and cuts. Our identification strategy 
exploits daily variations in the flow of information about job openings and closings 
within counties. The high frequency of our data coupled with spatial variation allows 
us to control both for fixed and time-dependent unobserved heterogeneity. We exploit 
as good as random variations in daily announcements and in exact timing of release 
from prison to identify the effect of news about job flows on recidivism. We define 
recidivism as re-entering prison within 6 months of one’s release.  
 
This exercise allows us to document empirical facts and to provide policy-relevant 
interpretation. First, we find no effect of general local labor market conditions on 
recidivism. However, we find that relevant labor markets do affect recidivism. An 
increase in manufacturing sector job vacancies in one’s county of residence just after 
their release from prison reduces recidivism.  
 
We then document that, conditional on existing job vacancies, media coverage of job 
creations affects former inmates’ propensity to re-offend. Holding constant the 
number of jobs, former inmates are less likely to recidivate when there is more media 
coverage of available jobs. Conversely, an increase in the number of announcements 
on future job cuts does not affect the probability of re-offending. Our preferred 
interpretation of these results is that media coverage of job creations provides useful 
information to former inmates in search of legitimate employment opportunities. This 
interpretation is supported by further evidence. News about job creations covered in 
the thirty days before an inmate’s release has no effect on recidivism. Moreover, news 
published in pure player digital media outlets (that is, outlets that only publish content 
online and not in print), which are less popular than newspaper websites have no 
effect on the probability of re-offending. Thus, our results indicate that both the 
probability of finding a legal job and media coverage about the availability of jobs 
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can help reduce reoffending.  
 
Prior studies have looked at the aggregate relation between labor market conditions 
and crime, to explore the theoretical prediction of a positive relation between 
unemployment and crime. The evidence provided by these studies is mixed. Most 
studies find little effect of labor market conditions on property crimes and mixed 
evidence for violent crime rates when using linear regressions (Raphael and Winter-
Ebmer, 2001; Machin and Meghir, 2004; Oster and Agell, 2007; Lin, 2008). 
Instrumental variable estimates find an increase in property crimes with higher 
unemployment (Gould et al., 2002; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Oster and 
Agell, 2007; Fougere, et al., 2009).  
 
Only a few papers focus on the effect of labor market conditions on offending of 
former inmates or specifically of individuals at higher risk to offend. Summer jobs for 
at-risk youth have been shown to reduce violence and victimization (Heller, 2014; 
Gelber et al., 2016), and targeted job opportunities for former inmates reduce 
recidivism in the short run (Redcross et al., 2011). We know very little about whether 
and how these findings carry over to a broader population of adults; moreover, we 
know very little about how they carry over to those who are more involved in the 
criminal justice system. A few recent papers examine the relation between labor 
market opportunities and recidivism for adults. Schnepel (2017) uses data on parolees 
released from prison in California and examines the effects of variations in local 
unemployment rates among unskilled individuals, finding that an increase in relevant 
industries’ unskilled unemployment is associated with higher recidivism. Also 
looking at parolees from California, Raphael and Weiman (2007) find moderate 
effects of county unemployment rates on the likelihood that paroled offenders will 
return to custody. Finally, Yang (2017) uses quarterly and county-level data from the 
US to study the effect of employment and wages on recidivism, and finds a negative 
relation between local labor market conditions and recidivism.  
 
Relative to these studies, we study all former French inmates, not people released 
from federal prisons, or parolees, the latter being generally selected for good behavior 
or other positive qualities which may make them particularly responsive to labor 
market conditions. Moreover, our identification strategy includes variations in job 
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flows. While most studies on crime and the labor market use unemployment levels, 
we can look at the effect of both job openings and cuts. Our identification strategy 
exploits within county variations in job openings at the daily level, thus overcoming 
the major identification challenges without needing an instrumental variable design.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first documenting the impact of news 
coverage of labor market opportunities on reoffending. We show how alternative 
sources of information about job flows (i.e., media coverage) can be useful to grasp 
some of the mechanisms underlying individual responses to labor market conditions. 
In the same vein, recent work has used data from Careerbuilder.com to look at worker 
mobility (Marinescu and Rathelot, 2014) and general equilibrium effects of increased 
unemployment benefits (Marinescu, 2014). Using online news on jobs as a finer-
grained proxy for unemployment could have applications to many topics in labor 
studies, both to improve identification, and to capture the exact timing of events.  
 
Finally, our paper is also, to the best of our knowledge, the first focusing on the 
impact of local labor market conditions on re-offending outside the US. Because 
incarceration rate is uniquely high in the United States, it is likely that the marginal 
person released from prison in the US is very different from the marginal person 
being released from prison in continental European countries or the UK. It may be 
difficult to generalize results found in recent papers suggesting a protective effect of 
good local labor markets outside the US. While legitimate labor opportunities are 
effective on the relatively less crime-prone former inmates released from American 
facilities, they might not be effective on European inmates who have relatively more 
severe criminal histories (Buonanno and Raphael, 2013). In our study, we recover 
results similar to the US case for inmates with shorter sentences and stronger links to 
legitimate labor markets before incarceration: an increase in available jobs in some 
sectors reduces reoffending. Conversely, for inmates who spend longer time in prison, 
a simple increase in job availability does not affect recidivism; media coverage about 
job availability becomes crucial in order to reduce re-offending. These inmates are 
likely to have weaker connections to networks providing access to legal job 
opportunities and hence higher job search costs. Media coverage about future job 
openings can provide crucial information about available jobs that would be hard to 
access otherwise. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents institutions and data; Section 3 
exposes our empirical strategy, Section 4 presents the effect of labor markets, 
captured by official statistics on recidivism, Section 5 documents the importance of 
information on labor markets, and section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Institutions and Data 
 
2.1. Incarceration in France 
 
As of January 2013, there were 66,572 inmates in France, amounting to an 
incarceration rate of about 110/100,000.3 While smaller than that of the United States, 
which was around 910/100,000 in 2014 (Glaze and Kazble, 2014), this incarceration 
rate is close to the median for Europe. Sentences in France tend to be short: thirty-six 
percent of sentences are shorter than one year and sixty-six percent are shorter than 
three years. A corollary of that is that there is a high turnover rate in French prisons. 
There were 87,958 releases from prison in 2012. Fifty-one percent (ninety-one 
percent respectively) of inmates released respectively had spent less than six months 
(one year) in custody.4 People released from prison in France are comparable, in 
terms of length of incarceration, to people released from jails in the US.  
 
There are different kinds of detention facilities in France. “Maison d’arret” (101 
facilities) are for pre-trial detention and sentences less than 1 year. Post-sentencing, 
inmates either serve their time in a low-security “centre de détention” (62 facilities), 
or a high-security “maison centrale” (11 facilities). Inmates have access to work and 
training. Out of the 82,000 persons incarcerated in 2010, 24,000 worked at least one 
hour and 23,900 benefited from some training while in prison, but only 4,400 were 
enrolled in degree-bearing courses. 18,000 persons benefited from job search 
                                                      
3 Statistics on French and European incarceration can be found at 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/Chiffres_cles_2013_opt.pdf  
4 All figures in this paragraph are calculated by the authors using official statistics on overall outcomes 
of trials from the Ministry of Justice (Ministère de la Justice (2012), pp. 211-217). 
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assistance, but only 5,400 found employment or training before release.5 Information 
about job opportunities may be hard to come across while in prison, since Internet 
access is forbidden. Cell phones could be smuggled into jails, but our data is from 
2009-2010 when smartphones were not widely used in France. In 2008, only 12% of 
people used their smartphones to go on the Internet, compared to 40% of people in 
2012. So while some people might have had Internet access while in prison in 2010, 
this was plausibly a rare occurrence.6 Newspapers are available in prison but mainly 
through prison libraries, that are generally accessible in lieu of outdoor activities. 
 
Most inmates in France are released without supervision. In order to obtain sentence 
adjustments such as parole, electronic monitoring, or access to a halfway house, 
prisoners must explain their post-release plan to a judge, who assesses their ability to 
reintegrate. In practice, a job or training is needed to obtain a supervised early release. 
In 2009, there were 84,442 releases, out of which 7,871 were paroles (9%), 6,038 
were electronic monitoring (7%) and 5,472 were to halfway houses (6%). The 
remaining 77% of inmates were released without supervision.7 
 
Relevant to our study of jobs and recidivism, criminal background checks are 
generally illegal for employment purposes in France. Convicted people are barred 
from fewer professions than in the US. However, they are barred from nearly all 
public-sector jobs, which represent roughly 20% of France’s labor force.8 Criminal 
records can also be checked for sensitive jobs (for instance, law enforcement, or 
working with children or the elderly). There are also no rules barring convicted 
people from living anywhere. They may have restraining orders, but most former 
inmates can return to live where they were prior to incarceration.  
 
 
 
                                                      
5 Figures in this paragraph reflect official statistics from January 1st, 2011. Source: 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/chiffres_cles_2011.pdf 
6 Source: http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=ip1452 
7 Calculated by the authors using official statistics on overall outcomes of trials from the Ministry of 
Justice (Ministère de la Justice (2012), pp. 217, 221 and 223). 
8 The list of jobs for which one must have a clear criminal background can be found here: 
http://www.cidj.com/sites/default/files/liste_des_metiers_pouvant_donner_lieu_a_la_consultation_dire
cte_du_b2.pdf 
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2.2. Individual Incarceration Records 
 
France has a centralized prison system. The French Department of Prisons 
Administration (DAP) runs all prisons and jails. We obtained an administrative 
dataset on all inmates in French prisons in 2008 – 2010. A penal file is created upon 
each inmate's incarceration in France, and updated throughout the incarceration 
period. The file contains penal and socio-demographic data, and information on 
transfers within and across prisons, disciplinary incidents, and sentence reductions. 
All of this data populates the National Inmate File and the Numeric File of 
Management of Inmates under Custody File, 9  which are centralized in the DAP. 
These files are maintained for internal accountability and security purposes, and the 
French Ministry of Justice uses them for statistical purposes. The French Department 
of Prisons Administration generously provided administrative data on all inmates 
incarcerated in France between February 1st, 2009 and January 31st, 2011. 
 
The data contains information on gender, date of birth, nationality, place of birth, 
place of residency, marital status, number of children, educational attainment, job 
status (all of which are reported by the inmates themselves, and reflect their situation 
upon incarceration), offenses leading to incarceration, length of sentence for each 
offense, date of trial, type of prison, date of release, and sentence reductions. Each 
individual can be tracked over time with a unique encrypted identifier.10 Our outcome 
of interest is recidivism, which is measured as a person reappearing in the prison 
dataset six months after having been released from prison.11 In order to have a six-
month observation window for all people released from prison, our main observation 
sample is people released from prison between February 1st, 2009 and July 31st, 2010.  
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on our sample. 96% of people released from 
prison are male, 86% are French, and they are on average 32 years old upon release. 
The most frequent offenses are theft (36%), assault (35%), driving under influence 
                                                      
9 Fichier National des Détenus, FND, and Gestion Informatisée des Détenus en Etablissement, GIDE 
10 These are unique identifiers, based on first name, last name, and date of birth. For confidentiality 
purposes, the encrypting was done at the Ministry of Justice. 
11 While we don’t have the data to observe all new sentences, incarceration is the most frequent 
sentence for people who are released from prison. Kensey and Benaouda (2011) find that 59% of 
people released from prison have a new conviction within 5 years, and 46% have a new prison 
sentence; so three quarters convictions after release from prison are new prison sentences.    
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DUI (28%), and drug offenses (22%). Relevant to our study, 39% reported being 
unemployed before entering prison, demonstrating thin ties with the official labor 
market. Most defendants have low levels of educational attainment (38% have a 
middle school degree, and 10% have no schooling at all). 7% of defendants were 
released on parole, and 93% were released without any supervision. 6% had returned 
to prison in the following six months.  
 
 
2.3. Labor Market Data 
 
2.3.1 Job Vacancies Data  
 
The French governmental agency for unemployment, “pole emploi” (PE), operates all 
unemployment policies. It registers unemployed people, manages unemployment 
benefits and provides job search assistance. It registers about one third of job 
vacancies in France (Skandalis and Philippe, 2017). These vacancies are publicly 
available on the website, and anyone can apply for the position, with or without 
formal registration as job seeker.  
 
We obtained data on the number of vacancies published on the PE website, per county 
and per day in 2009 and 2010. For 2010, we obtained more detailed data on vacancies 
per type of job. Since we have data on recidivism for inmates released before July 
31st, 2010, in our main sample, we focus on February 2009 – July 2010. On average, 
72 vacancies are published each day, with large variations across counties – on 
average 7 per day in the smallest county, and 316 per day in Paris – and across days – 
there are almost no vacancy published during the weekend.  
 
We use this dataset to create our main measure of local labor market conditions. For 
each day and county (départment) in France, we compute the number of job openings 
published on the PE website within the next 30 days. By matching this information to 
each person’s release date, we thus obtain a measure of labor market conditions in the 
former inmate’s county, for the first 30 days after release from prison. This measure 
varies from 0 to 15,940 with an average of 2,205 (table 1).  
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Since the effect of each additional vacancy depends on the size of the labor market, 
we standardize this measure within county.12 By doing so, we make sure to compare 
similar dynamics within each county.  
 
2.3.2 News and Job Posting Data 
 
Our final data source compiles publicly accessible online information on news stories 
about job openings and cuts posted online. The data was collected for commercial 
purposes by a private firm, the Observatoire de l’Investissement. It assembles 
information from about 4,000 Internet sources, which include local newspapers 
(43%), national newspapers, and websites covering job announcements. Note that this 
data source does not contain actual job postings or classified ads; it contains news 
articles on economic events, such as plant closures or openings. We used a pre-
compiled version of this online data, but this information could also be collected by 
scraping job announcement websites and searching local and national newspapers for 
stories on labor markets.  
 
This data contains one line per mention of job-related news story. We classify as 
“positive announcements” stories on opening of new plants or increases in the number 
of perspective employees. We classify as “negative announcements” stories on plant 
closures or downsizing.13 We use this dataset to create our measures of news about 
local labor market conditions. For each day and each county (départment), we build 
measures of the number of news stories on job creations and cuts that appeared on any 
source listed in the dataset in the following 30 days. By matching on release date and 
county of residence, we obtain a measure of job openings and cuts that occur in the 
county each former inmate lived in, for the first 30 days after their release from 
prison. Our main measure excludes news on public sector jobs, since as mentioned 
earlier former offenders are not allowed to hold civil servant positions.14  
                                                      
12 In practice, for each day, we compute the following variable: 
𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 =
𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑡 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑐 )
𝑆𝐷(𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑐 )
 
where 𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑡  is the number of vacancies in the 30 days following t in county c. 
13 Also for simplicity, we refer jointly to positive and negative stories and announcements as “news 
stories about jobs.” 
14 Public sector announcements represent 2.2% of the 22,545 announcements. While we know who the 
employer is (and so we can easily identify public sector jobs), we do not have information on the 
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We distinguish between two types of sources: newspaper websites and pure-players, 
the latter being less popular (see appendix figure B1). In our analyses of the effect of 
information, we focus on news covered by newspapers’ websites. While news 
published on pure-players’ website can be a proxy for the local job labor conditions, 
since they have low audiences, it is less likely that they would change former inmates’ 
knowledge or perception of labor market conditions.  
 
Descriptive statistics of the news are presented in table 1. There are, on average, 1.4 
positive news stories and 1.7 negative news stories in journal websites per county in a 
30-day time window. There are fewer stories on job creations and cuts in pure-player 
media, with, on average, 1.2 news stories on job creations and only 0.23 news stories 
on job cuts per county in a 30-day window.  
 
We do not standardize this variable by county. Indeed, news on job creations and 
destructions capture information that former inmates may have access to. As opposed 
to job vacancies, information is a non-rival good. Regardless of the size of the labor 
market, all former inmates can have equal access to this information. 
 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
 
We start our analysis by focusing on the effect of job vacancies on recidivism. Our 
analysis is informative about how offenders respond to local employment conditions. 
To estimate the effect of local labor market conditions on recidivism of French former 
inmates, we first estimate the following linear regression model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑑 =  𝐴𝑐 +  𝐵𝑑 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑑 + 𝛽𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑑 (1) 
 
Where Yicd is an indicator of recidivism within six months after release (for individual 
                                                                                                                                                        
position within the firm. For example, we cannot determine if a news story at Google is about cleaning 
crew jobs, or a software engineer jobs.  
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i, released on day d, and living in a county c before incarceration),15 𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑, is 
a forward-looking variable: capturing the normalized volume of vacancies in the 
thirty days after day d in county 𝑐. 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑑 controls for individual characteristics; and 𝐴𝑐  
and 𝐵𝑑 are a set of county and day fixed effects respectively.  
 
To estimate the effect of media coverage of labor market conditions on recidivism of 
French former inmates, we estimate the following linear regression model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑑 =  𝐴𝑐 +  𝐵𝑑 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑑 + 𝛽𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 + 𝛽1𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑐𝑑
+ + 𝛽2𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑐𝑑
−  𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑑  (2) 
 
Equation (2) has the same structure of equation (1). We add two new variables. 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑐𝑑
+
 
and 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑐𝑑
−  respectively capture the number of news stories on job creations and on job 
cuts covered in the county of residence of a former inmate in the thirty days following 
her release from incarceration. In our main analyses, we focus on job announcements 
on newspaper websites, which are more popular, and not on online-only pure-player 
websites. 
 
For both job vacancies and news, we focus on the 30 days immediately following 
one’s release from prison (defined as ‘month of release’). We focus on the period 
immediately following incarceration for two reasons. First, the first few weeks have 
been shown to be crucial in terms of successfully transitioning out of prison (Munyo 
and Rossi, 2015).16 Second, access to information is limited in French penal facilities. 
As specified above, there is no Internet connection and limited access to newspapers. 
The main source of information is national TV channels, which likely do not have a 
lot of information about local labor market conditions. 
 
One concern may be that people released under positive labor market conditions are 
different from people released in less auspicious conditions. As we stressed above, 
                                                      
15 We hypothesize that the relevant labor market is the labor market in the county that an inmate 
reported living in upon incarceration. One may wonder how mobility could affect our estimates. First, 
note that among inmates who were incarcerated twice and so for whom we have two home addresses, 
90% reported living in the same county both times, indicating that mobility is not frequent among 
people released from prison in France. Second, even if former inmates were to move, this would result 
in an attenuation bias of our estimates, and so our estimates would be lower bound of the true effect of 
local labor markets on recidivism.  
16 In France, 34% of ex-offenders have been re-convicted within three years after trial. Among them, 
8% are re-convicted during the first month. 
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since we use daily variations in labor market conditions, our identification hypothesis 
is that, conditional on fixed county heterogeneity and common daily shocks, 
variations for these measures are not correlated with individual-level heterogeneity 
and other county-level confounding factors that may be correlated with labor market 
conditions. Since the exact date of release is as good as random given trial-specific 
timing, our identification hypothesis concerning individual-level confounding factors 
is plausible.  
 
Table 2 presents the correlation between offender characteristics and our two main 
economic variables. In the last column, the variable of interest is predicted recidivism, 
which we obtain using all baseline observables, and which allows us to look at the 
relation between a summary of observables and recidivism. Each panel represents 
independent regressions – panel A is for official vacancies, and panel B is for news on 
jobs. As for our main estimations, these regressions include day and county fixed 
effects. For most covariates, differences across the board are not statistically 
significant, and when significant, the point estimates are small. Importantly, columns 
1 and 2 show that it does not seem like releases are correlated with job market 
conditions: neither number of releases from prison by day nor county (column 1), nor 
likelihood of getting parole (column 2) are correlated with labor market conditions. 
Likewise, having a job pre-prison (column 5) is not correlated with labor market 
conditions. Some variables are correlated with labor market conditions; for example, 
age at release and assault are correlated with more positive journal announcements, 
and being French is correlated with more Pole Emploi job creations. However, in 
these cases, the point estimates are small and column 14 shows that predicted 
recidivism is not meaningfully correlated with the employment measures. Overall, 
this suggests that within day and county, former inmates’ characteristics are not 
correlated to job opportunities.  
 
4. Effect of job vacancies on recidivism  
 
4.1. Main Results 
 
Table 3 reports the effect of overall economic conditions on recidivism. Column 1 
presents the effect of new job vacancies collected and released by Pole Emploi in 
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one’s county of residence, in the 30 days after release from prison. Column 3 presents 
the effect of vacancies when controlling for defendant characteristics. General labor 
markets as measured by changes in job vacancies in one’s county of residence, do not 
seem to affect recidivism. The coefficients are small and statistically non-significant. 
 
In the last two columns of table 3, we present the correlation between recidivism and 
economic conditions as measured by unemployment levels (column 3). As with job 
vacancies, the coefficient is small and insignificant.  
 
While the overall effect of vacancies does not seem to affect recidivism, it is possible 
that vacancies in some specific employment sectors do. As shown in table 1, former 
inmates are often low-skilled, so they may only respond to a subset of jobs. In this 
case, an aggregate indicator includes job opportunities that are irrelevant for former 
inmates. In table 4 we split job vacancies by sector. We find that, an increase in 
vacancies in the manufacturing sector significantly decreases recidivism. A one 
standard deviation increase in manufacturing job vacancies induces a 4% reduction in 
the propensity to recidivate in the first six months following release from 
incarceration. Vacancies in other sectors have no effect on recidivism. Our results are 
consistent with the findings of Schnepel (2017) who finds that in California, only 
relevant jobs matter to reduce recidivism. 
 
 
4.2. Heterogeneity of the effect 
 
In tables 5a and 5b we focus on differential effects. We restrict our analysis to 
manufacturing jobs, which, according to results presented in table 4, are the only jobs 
that affect recidivism. In table 5a, we divide the sample by incarceration histories, and 
in table 5b, by type of offense. Column 1 of table 5a presents the effect of 
manufacturing jobs for short-term jails, and column 2 is for longer-term prisons. In 
columns 3 to 6, we split the sample by quartiles of sentence length. The overall 
picture emerging is that new vacancies in the manufacturing sector have a negative 
and statistically significant effect on the propensity to re-offend for inmates who spent 
less time in prison.  
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Columns 7 and 8 of Table 5a show that both formerly employed and unemployed 
inmates are affected by job creations and reduce their propensity to recidivate when 
new job vacancies are created thirty days from their release from prison. The last part 
of the table reports the results for parolees versus non-parolees. Individuals on parole 
might be more sensitive to job creations since finding a job is often a condition to be 
granted parole. They are therefore more attached to the labor market. Results reported 
in the table confirm this intuition.  It is however worth noting that being released on 
parole is not predicted by the employment opportunities as shown in table 2. 
 
Table 5b presents results by type of offense upon recidivism, and shows that an 
increase in job vacancies reduces recidivism for all crime categories. For each crime 
(property crime, drug offense, DUI, assault), we compute a dummy equal to one if a 
defendant was re-incarcerated for that offense, which is the outcome variable. While 
jobs in industry do not influence economic crimes (theft or property crime), they 
influence recidivism for behavioral crimes, like assault and DUI. This suggests that 
one of the important channels through which better access to employment may be 
influencing future behavior is through affecting one’s engagement in risky behaviors, 
rather than one’s economic calculus of participation in crime.  
 
 
5. Media coverage of local labor market conditions 
 
In order to better understand how labor markets affect the choice to recidivate, we 
now turn to one particular element: job search. Specifically we study the effect of an 
indicator catching useful information in the job search process: news on jobs in the 
county of residence of a former inmate. We focus on the effect of news in local or 
national newspapers. The main difference between the measures of vacancies 
presented above is that this news measure catches the kind of information about local 
labor market conditions that every former inmate can easily access online or by 
reading the press. By contrast, in order to access PE jobs opportunities, former 
inmates need to sign up at the national employment agency or search for specific job 
offers. Conditional on the flow of local jobs, this measure catches readily available 
information about firms that are hiring in a former inmates’ area of residence. This 
kind of information might impact former inmates’ job search effort both by affecting 
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their beliefs about the probability of finding a job and by directing their search 
towards firms that could potentially hire them.  
 
Our implicit assumption is that people have beliefs about how likely they are to find a 
job upon release from prison. In the absence of additional information, they would 
make the decision to commit a crime based on their beliefs about their likelihood of 
finding a job: the higher (lower) the prospects of finding a job, the lower (higher) the 
likelihood that they would reoffend, due to the increase (decrease) in opportunity 
costs of crime. But beliefs could be shifted by additional information about the labor 
market, which could be obtained from media coverage of local employment and 
classified advertisements. Information about the existence of particular jobs also 
lowers search costs because former inmates can target their search effort to firms with 
vacancies. Note that this second channel may work even keeping constant the number 
of actual jobs available. By decreasing search costs, news would affect the propensity 
to reoffend either if searching for a job prevents individuals from committing a crime 
(through incapacitation), or if higher search efforts, keeping all else constant, increase 
the likelihood of actually finding a job. 
 
5.1. Main results 
 
Table 6 reports the main results. Column 1 includes the number of news stories on job 
openings (i.e. creations) and cuts in one’s county of residence, in the 30 days after 
release from prison. Announcements about job openings have a negative and 
significant impact on the probability to reoffend within six months after release. News 
on job cuts has no detectable effect on recidivism. Adding the full set of individual-
level observables (Column 2) and controlling for the flow of job vacancies published 
in the same thirty days after one’s release from incarceration (Column 3) does not 
change the magnitude of the coefficients, indirectly confirming that our variables of 
interest are orthogonal with respect to individual observables. Controlling for number 
of crimes per month and per county or unemployment also does not affect our 
estimates (column 4 and 5). While we cannot isolate the mechanisms, one explanation 
could be that news stories about job creations provide actual information about a 
sector or area that may be recruiting, whereas news stories on job destructions do not 
provide leads on how to target one’s search. While this may help applicants define 
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what particular firm not to apply to, it does not provide extra information.  
 
The last column of table 6 shows that while number of news stories affects 
recidivism, the number of jobs covered on each story does not – while positive for 
positive announcements, the magnitude is very small. This suggests that information 
may be especially helpful in pointing people towards sectors or companies in which to 
look for jobs, rather than giving exact information on what jobs are available. Those 
specifications suggest that the results are mainly driven by the effect of better 
information coupled with the effect of better labor market conditions.  
 
5.2. Discussion and policy implications 
 
Results reported in Table 6 suggest that information about available jobs matters. 
However, it is still possible that our news variables capture aspects of the economic 
conditions that are both different from the other economic variables and more relevant 
to the persons released from jail. In order to investigate this question, we run several 
additional analyses presented in table 7.  
 
First, if the effect presented in table 6 is driven by information, the timing of the news 
is of crucial importance. In the first column of table 7, we look at the effect of job 
announcements that appeared 30 days before release from incarceration. Coefficients 
are small and non-significant. This is very much consistent with the idea that people 
released from prison may not have seen that news. Conversely, this is not consistent 
with the idea that news captures a relevant economic dimension. In column 2, we 
measure the effect of economic news covered by pure-player digital media sources. 
The main observable difference with our measure of news is that the audience for 
these online-only sources of information is much lower than news published on news 
papers’ website.17 Column 2 indicates that information from these low-audience news 
outlets has no effect on recidivism. Indeed, the difference with the effect observed in 
table 6 could come from the nature of the events covered. However, the two types of 
news are collected by the same private firm, following the same procedure and the 
                                                      
17 News published on pure-player digital media sources are slightly less frequent (1.2 vs 1.4 in the 30 
days following release). However, these differences are unlikely to explain why the coefficient would 
be ten times smaller. 
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results are very much consistent with a story based on the access to information. In 
column 3 we look at the effect of news on public sector jobs. Those positions, 
according to French law, are not accessible for former inmates, thus we do not expect 
them to have an effect on recidivism if former inmates correctly process the 
information they obtain from the media. Results reported in column 3 confirm this 
intuition. 
 
We then add a further restriction to our main model by including county times 
calendar month fixed effects. In this specification, all the identification variation 
comes from within-month and within-county variation. Because the economic 
conditions do not evolve so rapidly, this is not a good way to identify the effect of the 
labor market on recidivism. However, information on the labor market depends on the 
news coverage that varies largely from one day to another. For example, if two 
persons release in county s at time t and t+1 face the same labor market conditions, 
the one released at t could potentially read news published at t that is not accessible to 
the other person at t+1. The effect of positive news presented in column 4 remains 
negative and significant. 
 
In the last part of the table (columns 5-8) we dig into the heterogeneity of the effects 
of media coverage. First, we document how inmates with different incarceration 
histories respond to the media coverage of job creations. When we compare inmates 
that were formerly unemployed to those that had a job before incarceration, positive 
news about job creations have a negative and statistically significant effect only for 
the former (columns 5 and 6). In the last part of the table we report results showing 
that the reduction on the probability of recidivism due to an increase in news about 
job creations is driven by former inmates that spent time in facilities dedicated to 
longer detention (column 7) and that spent a relatively longer time in prison (column 
8). These results are consistent with an information mechanism. Keeping constant the 
underlying labor market conditions, media exposure of new job creations affects 
former inmates with weaker ties to the legal jobs either because they were not 
employed before incarceration or because they spent more time in prison and were in 
more isolated facilities.  
 
The information effect that we have just documented could be due both to the fact that 
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positive news about labor market conditions increase former inmates’ optimism about 
the odds of finding a job the legal market and the fact that information about job 
creations reduces job search costs for former inmates. While we cannot tell the two 
channels apart, the results on negative announcements, and public sector seem to 
suggest that the second channel is prevalent. While negative announcements could 
increase one’s pessimism they do not affect search costs and are not correlated with a 
statistically significant increase in the propensity to recidivate. Moreover, former 
inmates do not react to jobs in the public sector that are not available to them while 
they might have done so if the effect was simply driven by some optimistic reaction to 
a perceived improvement of labor market conditions.  
 
There are many potential public policy levers that could be used to reduce recidivism. 
We then ask how job announcements contrast to other potential policies. A one 
standard-deviation increase in the number of positive news announcements (+ 2.1 
news stories) is correlated with a 4.7% decrease in recidivism. We can contrast this to 
other estimates in the literature: one extra month in prison is associated with a 4% 
reduction in recidivism (Kuziemko, 2013); two additional weeks in prison plus one 
extra month on probation are associated with 5% reduction in recidivism (Philippe, 
2015); one extra month in expected future sentences is associated with a 1.3% 
reduction in recidivism (Drago et. al., 2009). Depending on estimates, it appears that 
providing information to people on jobs is approximately equivalent to spending two 
extra months in prison, or expecting five more months in prison if re-convicted. 
 
The effects are smaller than those of alternatives to incarceration such as electronic 
monitoring, which are associated with a 25% (Ouss, 2013) to 50% (Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky, 2013) reduction in recidivism. Thus, avoiding incarceration altogether 
might be a more cost-effective way to reduce recidivism in some cases, but providing 
inmates information about available job opportunities at the time of their release from 
incarceration still appears to be very cost-effective policy.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Consistent with the economic approach to the study of crime we find that former 
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inmates respond to the incentives provided by variation in formal labor market 
opportunities. This confirms the role of incentives in the formal labor market, even 
though other research has shown the importance of informal employment for people 
when they are released from prison (Western et al, 2015). Our study adds to our 
knowledge about what works in reducing offending. Our results on media coverage of 
job creations and destructions suggest that information about local labor market 
conditions is valuable for inmates and reduces their propensity to recidivate, in 
particular for inmates that had weaker ties with the legal labor market before 
incarceration. Moreover, we show that the creation of legitimate labor market 
opportunities in some sectors also works in economies such as France where the share 
of inmates over the total population is lower, implying, on average, a higher 
dangerousness of the marginal inmate with respect to the US.  
 
From a policy perspective, the analysis suggests that policies targeted to reduce 
unemployment may have positive spillovers by reducing recidivism and highlights the 
role of information about job availability, over and beyond the effect of 
unemployment reduction – which is a harder policy lever to manipulate. Improving 
labor market conditions is costly, and focusing efforts on people released from prison 
or otherwise involved with criminal justice might be perceived as unfair, or 
potentially create some moral hazard problems. Our finding that media coverage of 
job creations matter has a much more tractable policy implication: diffusing relevant 
job information is much less costly than increasing employment. The importance of 
information has been shown to play an important role in other contexts, such as 
investments in schooling (Jensen, 2010 and Hoxby and Turner, 2015), risky sexual 
behaviors (Dupas, 2011), or retirement investments (Duflo and Saez, 2003). It is not a 
new finding that information would play an important role in labor markets (Stigler, 
1962). Some research places particular emphasis on its diffusion via social networks 
(Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004). Recent field experiments suggest that 
information interventions may be effective to reduce unemployment, especially 
among those at risk for longer streaks of unemployment – which could include former 
inmates (Altmann et al, 2015). Our findings suggest that improving matching through 
information could also impact important outcomes like offending, which might matter 
in particular when assessing the costs and benefits of social policies.  
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   Mean Standard Deviation 
O
ff
en
d
er
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h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
(N
=
9
9
,1
5
1
) 
Socio-demographics 
  
Female 0.04 0.20 
Born in France 0.80 0.40 
French 0.86 0.35 
Married 0.31 0.46 
Has children 0.42 0.49 
Had a job when incarcerated 0.61 0.49 
High school 0.10 0.30 
Middle school 0.38 0.49 
Technical education 0.32 0.47 
No school 0.09 0.29 
Age upon release 32.3 10.9 
Offending 
  
Theft 0.36 0.48 
Drugs 0.22 0.41 
DUI 0.28 0.45 
Assault 0.35 0.48 
Parole 0.07 0.26 
Short-term prison 0.68 0.47 
Recidivated within 6 months 0.06 0.23 
Incarceration length 213.4 349.6 
L
ab
o
r 
m
ar
k
et
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s Number of jobs created per 
month (Pole emploi) 
2205 1827 
Number of positive journal 
announcements per month 
1.42 2.10 
Number of negative journal 
announcements per month 
1.69 2.00 
 Number of positive online 
announcements per month 
1.21 2.10 
 Number of negative online 
announcements per month 
0.23 2.00 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics on releases from prison and job availability. These 
summary statistics on offenders represent people released from prison between 
February 1st, 2009 and July 31st, 2010. The summary statistics on number of journal 
announcements represent the same period, while figures on number of jobs created 
exclude the month of July, 2010, when data was not available (see online appendix 
A). Source: Authors’ calculations based on prison records, provided by the French 
Direction of Prison administration, employment data collected from Pole emploi, and 
news data collected from the Observatoire de l’Investissement. 
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Prison characteristics Socio-demographic characteristics Offense  
  
Number 
released 
Parole 
Short-term 
prison 
Sentence 
length 
Had a job 
pre-prison 
Female 
Age at 
release 
Married 
Has 
children 
Theft Drugs  DUI Assault  
Predicted 
Recidivism  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 PANEL A: Number of jobs created (Pole Emploi) 
Number of jobs  -0.025 -0.001 0.002 -0.895 -0.003 -0.001 -0.010 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.004* 0.004* 0.003 0.000 
 created (0.017) (0.002) (0.003) (2.072) (0.003) (0.001) (0.056) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) 
Observations 28,102 88,194 88,194 88,194 88,192 88,194 88,167 88,194 88,114 84,872 84,872 84,872 84,872 84,359 
Mean 3.153 0.0731 0.678 213.4 0.614 0.0435 32.32 0.308 0.415 0.355 0.216 0.278 0.346 0.0568 
 PANEL B: Journal Announcements 
Positive journal -0.0101 0.000 -0.000 0.093 0.002* 0.000 0.039*** -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.002*** -0.000*** 
 announcements (0.00803) (0.000) (0.001) (0.470) (0.001) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Negative journal  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.402 -0.000 -0.000 -0.032 -0.001* -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 announcements (0.009) (0.000) (0.002) (0.734) (0.001) (0.000) (0.023) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations 31,447 99,151 99,151 99,151 99,149 99,151 99,120 99,151 99,064 95,770 95,770 95,770 95,770 95,201 
Outcome Mean 3.153 0.0731 0.678 213.4 0.614 0.0435 32.32 0.308 0.415 0.355 0.216 0.278 0.346 0.0568 
Table 2: Characteristics of defendants released from prison, by labor market characteristics. The dependent variable of each regression is 
specified in the column header. Each Panel represent a separate set of regressions. We regress each dependent variable on the following 
measures of the labor market 30 days after one’s release from prison: number of pole emploi announcements (normalized at the county level), 
for panel A; and number of positive and negative journal announcements for panel B. These regressions also include department and day fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Source: Authors’ calculations based on prison records, provided by the French 
Direction of Prison administration, employment data collected from Pole emploi, and news data collected from the Observatoire de 
l’Investissement 
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Outcome:  
Recidivism, measured as having a new 
incarceration within 6 months after release from 
prison   (1) (2) (3) 
        
Number of jobs created  
 
0.0006 0.0005 
 (Pole Emploi) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
 Unemployment flow 
  
0.0004 
   
(0.0017) 
Unemployment rate 
   
    Observations 88,194 84,359 95,201 
Mean Recidivism 0.0573 0.0573 0.0573 
Controls Department All All 
 
 
Table 3: Job creations and recidivism within 6 months. Number of jobs created, 
unemployment rate, and unemployment flow are within county, in the 30 days 
following one’s release from prison. The measure for “number of jobs created” is 
normalized at the county level. Controls in columns 2–4 are for: age, gender, 
nationality (French or other), place of birth (France or other), type of release 
(probation or not), a dummy for reporting being married, a dummy for reporting 
having children, type of offense, type of prison of release (short term or long term), 
education, day of release and county. All standard errors are clustered at the county 
level. Source: Authors’ calculations based on prison records, provided by the French 
Direction of Prison administration, and data collected from Pole emploi. Note: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
  
 29 
 
 
Outcome: 
Recidivism, measured as having a new incarceration 
within 6 months after release from prison 
N
o
rm
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Agriculture 0.0001 
 (0.0016) 
Communications 0.0001 
 
(0.0009) 
Services 0.0005 
 
(0.0006) 
Finance -0.0003 
 
(0.0014) 
Manufacturing -0.0041** 
 
(0.0017) 
Transportation -0.0021 
 
(0.0016) 
Construction 0.0014 
 
(0.0019) 
 Observations 37,841 
 Mean Recidivism  0.0573 
 
Table 4: Job creations and recidivism within 6 months, by type of job created. Each 
measure for “number of jobs created” is normalized at the county level. Each line 
represents a separate regression. Information on type of job is only available in 2010 
and not in 2009, and so the sample is smaller than in table 3. Controls are for: age, 
gender, nationality (French or other), place of birth (France or other), type of release 
(probation or not), a dummy for reporting being married, a dummy for reporting 
having children, type of offense, type of prison of release (short term or long term), 
education, day of release and county. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on prison records, provided by the French 
Direction of Prison administration, and data collected from Pole emploi. Note: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Outcome:  Recidivism, measured as having a new incarceration within 6 months after release from prison 
 Type of prison of release Quartile of Sentence Length 
Employment status before 
incarceration 
Type of release from 
prison 
  Short-term Long-term Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3  Quartile 4 Unemployed Employed Parole No Parole 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Number of Pole Emploi -0.0047** -0.0029 -0.0091** -0.0012 -0.0049 -0.0012 -0.0035 -0.0041** -0.0042** -0.0024 
 Manufacturing jobs (0.0020) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0065) 
Observations 25,079 12,762 9,580 9,001 9,275 9,985 14,637 37,841 35,059 2,782 
Mean Recidivism 0.0576 0.0568 0.0658 0.0468 0.0497 0.0667 0.0731 0.0474 0.0590 0.0364 
 
Table 5a: Heterogeneity in the effect of manufacturing jobs on recidivism. The measure of “jobs created in manufacturing” is normalized at the 
county level. Each regression includes controls for: age, gender, nationality (French or other), place of birth (France or other), type of release 
(probation or not), a dummy for reporting being married, a dummy for reporting having children, type of offense, type of prison of release (short 
term or long term), education, day of release and county. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Source: Authors’ calculations based 
on prison records, provided by the French Direction of Prison administration, and data collected from Pole emploi. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.10. 
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Outcome: 
Recidivism by type of offense, measured as having a new incarceration within 6 months after release from 
prison, for the offense specified in the header  
  Property offense Drug offense DUI Assault 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of Pole Emploi -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0030*** -0.0032*** 
 Manufacturing jobs (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
Observations 37,841 
Mean Recidivism after 6 
months, for each offense 0.0276 0.0116 0.0158 0.0211 
 
Table 5b: Heterogeneity in the effect of manufacturing jobs on recidivism (continued). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
defendant recidivated for the offense specified in the column header. The measure of “jobs created in manufacturing” is normalized at the county 
level. Each regression includes controls for: age, gender, nationality (French or other), place of birth (France or other), type of release (probation 
or not), a dummy for reporting being married, a dummy for reporting having children, type of offense, type of prison of release (short term or 
long term), education, day of release and county. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Source: Authors’ calculations based on prison 
records, provided by the French Direction of Prison administration, and data collected from Pole emploi. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Outcome  
 
Recidivism, measured as having a new incarceration within 6 months after release from prison 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)) 
             
Positive news  -0.00083*** -0.00069** -0.00080*** -0.00083*** -0.00069** -0.00106*** 
 
(0.00029) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00030) 
Negative news 0.00003 0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00009 0.00011 -0.00003 
 
(0.00043) (0.00043) (0.00047) (0.00048) (0.00043) (0.00050) 
Number of jobs created  
 
  
0.00054 0.00041 
 
0.00001*** 
 (Pole Emploi) 
  
(0.00117) (0.00115) 
 
(0.00000) 
Average number of jobs       0.00000 
 Per positive news story      (0.00000) 
Average number of jobs       0.00054 
 Per negative news story      (0.00117) 
Crime Rate  
   
-0.00000 
 
 
 
   
(0.00000) 
  
Unemployment Flow 
    
0.00041  
 
    
(0.00176)  
Observations 99,151 95,201 84,359 95,201 95,201 84,359 
 
 
     
Controls Department All All All All  
      
 
Mean recidivism  0.0573  
 
Table 6: News coverage of jobs and recidivism. Number of jobs created, unemployment rate, 
and unemployment flow are within county. The measure for “number of jobs created” is 
normalized at the county level. Controls in columns 2–5 are for: age, gender, nationality 
(French or other), place of birth (France or other), type of release (probation or not), a dummy 
for reporting being married, a dummy for reporting having children, type of offense, type of 
prison of release (short term or long term), education, day of release and county. All standard 
errors are clustered at the county level. Source: Authors’ calculations based on prison records, 
provided by the French Direction of Prison administration, data collected from Pole emploi, 
and data collected from the Observatoire de l’Investissement. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10. 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Outcome:  
 
Recidivism, measured as having a new incarceration within 6 months after release from prison 
 
 
News 
before 
release 
News on 
the internet 
News on 
public 
sector jobs 
Month* 
County FE 
Employment status before 
incarceration 
Type of prison of release 
      Unemployed Employed Short-term Long-term 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Positive news  
   
-0.00165** -0.00104** -0.00062 -0.00005 -0.00170*** 
    
(0.00079) (0.00046) (0.00039) (0.00046) (0.00062) 
Negative news    -0.00014 -0.00014 0.00001 -0.00014 -0.00039 
    (0.00085) (0.00077) (0.00048) (0.00069) (0.00071) 
Number of jobs created  
 
0.00059 0.00056 0.00065 -0.00529** 0.00010 0.00063 -0.00059 0.00311 
 (Pole Emploi) (0.00118) (0.00118) (0.00117) (0.00222) (0.00225) (0.00140) (0.00141) (0.00227) 
Positive news,  0.00041        
  30 days pre-release (0.00035)        
Negative new, 0.00069        
  30 days pre-release (0.00060)        
Positive web news  -0.00009       
  (0.00046)       
Negative web news  -0.00022       
  (0.00095)       
Positive news,    0.00248      
  Public sector jobs   (0.00240)      
Negative news,    0.00125      
  Public sector jobs   (0.00188)      
Observations 84,359 84,359 84,359 84,359 32,527 51,832 57,601 26,758 
Mean Recidivism 0.0573 0.0573 0.0573 0.0573 0.0731 0.0474 0.0571 0.0568 
 
Table 7: News coverage of jobs and recidivism: mechanisms. The measure for 
“number of jobs created” is normalized at the county level. Regressions include 
controls for: age, gender, nationality (French or other), place of birth (France or 
other), type of release (probation or not), a dummy for reporting being married, a 
dummy for reporting having children, type of offense, type of prison of release (short 
term or long term), education, day of release and county. All standard errors are 
clustered at the county level. Source: Authors’ calculations based on prison records, 
provided by the French Direction of Prison administration, data collected from Pole 
emploi, and data collected from the Observatoire de l’Investissement. Note: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Appendix A: Data sources and availability period.  
 
In our paper, we use three main data sources, each of which is available for a different 
time period. In this appendix, we synthesize data availability for each source, and 
what time period is used for each analyses.  
Prison Records Data. This data was provided by the French Department of Prison 
Administration. We use this data for two purposes: to get information about people 
released from prison, and to measure recidivism, defined as "returning to prison 6 
months after release". We obtained this from February 1st, 2008 to January 31st, 2011. 
In order to have a 6-months time window for all inmates released from prison, we 
have a full sample of people released from prison between February 1st, 2009 and July 
31st, 2010.  
Job Vacancies Data. This data was provided by the French governmental agency for 
unemployment, “pole emploi”. We obtained aggregate data on job availabilities for 
2009 and 2010. The data is missing for the month of June 2010. Since we compute 
our labor market measures for the 30 days after one's release for prison, this means 
that our main analyses on job vacancies does not include people released in May and 
June 2010.  
In some of our analyses, we also include information on types of jobs. This 
information is available in November and December 2009, and in 2010, except for the 
month of June 2010. 
News and Jobs Posting data. This data was compiled by the by a private firm, the 
Observatoire de l’Investissement. We obtain information between January 2009 and 
December, 2010.  
Given availability of these different data sources, our main analyses cover inmates 
released from prison between February 1st, 2009 and April 30th, 2010, and in July 
2010.  
Tables 4, 5a and 5b focus on types of jobs available. These analyses are for inmates 
released from prison between November 1st, 2009 and April 30th, 2010, and in July 
2010. 
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Appendix B: Google searches per week, by media sources  
 
Table B1: Google search per week in 2009-2010, for the six most frequent news 
sources in the Observatoire de l’Inverstissement job announcement dataset. These 
sources represent 25% of all announcements (positive or negative). Three of these 
sources are newspaper websites: Ouest France, La voix du nord, La dépêche. The 
three others are pure players: L’observatoire de la franchise, Franchise magazine, 
Usine Nouvelle. 
 
 
 
 
 
